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I. INTRODUCTION
The free movement of goods, persons and capital and the freedom
of establishment and services' throughout the EEC were the four
fundamental objectives the Treaty of Rome' sought to accomplish in
establishing the Community. In addition, the Treaty provided for the
implementation of common Community policies toward agriculture,
as well as transport and commercial relations with third countries. It
also outlined specific rules for competition. Through the attainment
of these freedoms and the implementations of these sectoral policies
during a twelve year transitional period, the full measure of
integration' envisioned by the Treaty of Rome was to be achieved.
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1. In the context of EEC law, freedom of establishment provides generally the
right of Community nationals and companies to enjoy national treatment within
each member state of the Community concerning all matters of economic
self-employment, except nonprofit-making activity. Freedom to supply services
creates a residual category of economic activity embracing those services not
governed by the Treaty of Rome's provisions relating to free movement of goods,
persons and capital. See generally U. EVERLING, THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISH-
MENT IN THE COMMON MARKET (1964).
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, signed March 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as Treaty of
Rome]. The official text currently exists only in the French, German, Italian and
Dutch languages; with the accession of the United Kingdom an official English
text will be prepared. The text referred to in this study is the revised English
translation prepared by the British Foreign Office in 1967 and available from Her
Majesty's Stationery Office.
3. For a discussion of the transitional period see COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. FOURTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVI-
TIES OF THE COMMUNITIES 1970 (1971). For an interesting and critical
account of the concept of sectoral integration in Western Europe see L.
LINDBERG & S. SCHIENGOLD, EUROPE'S WOULD-BE POLITY (1970).
The concern of this article is the development of a common
commercial policy by the EEC. This aspect of Community integration
is particularly important today for two reasons. First, the common
commercial policy (CCP) is one of the areas in which integration has
been most difficult to achieve. To know the present state of the CCP
is to understand the present state of Community integration.4
Secondly, the development of the CCP has important ramifications for
the commercial dealings between the United States and the EEC
member states. In the post-transitional period, all matters within the
scope of the CCP will be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the EEC
and not the member states.' Therefore, an analysis of the content and
scope of the CCP will also determine the precise nature of the
commercial relationships between these parties after the total integra-
tion of the Common Market is achieved. Prior to beginning such an
analysis, however, an explanation of the legal origins and the
economic and political bases of the concept is necessary to place it in
a proper perspective.
II. BACKGROUND-THE COMMUNITY AND THE CCP
A. Community Commitment
Article 110 of the Treaty of Rome outlines the broad aims of the
Community concerning external trade with third countries:
By establishing a customs union between themselves, the Member States aim
to contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of
world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade
and the lowering of customs barriers.
The article emphasizes the special responsibility of the Community in
the area of commercial policy.6 In principle, therefore, the institu-
4. See generally C. KIM, LA COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE DANS LES
RELATIONS COMMERCIALES INTERNATIONALES (1971).
5. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 113. For an example of the
complications that may arise for the United States see Decision 69/494 du 16
decembre 1969, 1969 E.E.C. J.O. L326/39. In brief, this Council Decision calls
for the substitution of EEC agreements for existing bilateral agreements between
EEC member states and third countries that fall under the CCP. This means that
all present U.S. commercial agreements with EEC member states will be
transformed into agreements to be negotiated directly with the EEC in the future.
6. Rapport fait au nom de la commission des relations 4conomiques
extdrieures sur les problems de la politique commerciale commune a l'issue de la
p~riode de transition pr6vue par le trait6 CEE,[1970-1971] EUR. PARL. Docs.,
No. 32, at 6 [hereinafter cited as Kriedemann Report].
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tions and member states of the EEC have undertaken a firm
commitment to pursue liberal foreign trade policies. Although article
110 is couched in general terms, it is binding on member states as
contracting parties. Consequently, it is not simply a vague policy
statement, but is obligatory in nature.7 Difficulties arise, however,
because the Treaty of Rome gives neither a precise definition of the
concept of commercial policy nor an exhaustive treatment of the
extent of application of such a policy.
B. Economic and Political Bases
Article 3(b) of the Treaty of Rome states that one of the dual
purposes of the Community is to establish "a common customs tariff
and a common commercial policy towards third countries." This
mention of the institution of a common customs tariff with a
concomitant reference to the CCP is not a coincidence, but is derived
from sound economic principles.8 Unlike a "free trade area," which
calls only for removal of trade barriers between member states, the
Common Market acts as a customs union to require the imposition of
a common external tariff toward nonmember states.9 In terms of
international economics, the theory underpinning a customs union
acknowledges that the union will produce both trade creation and
trade diversion effects, but also maintains that its net contribution to
the international economy as a whole will be positive to the extent
that the former effect predominates."0
7. "This clause must properly be regarded as being obligatory, at least in its
second part, rather than a mere declaration of intent. Despite its wording, it is
binding not only on member States, but also on the institutions of the
Community, since the member States made that declaration in their capacity as
contracting parties, thus committing also the bodies instituted by the Treaty. It is,
however, questionable how far any specific conclusions can be drawn from this
general wording in a concrete case. The margin for the judgment of the
institutions and the limits to their discretion are so wide that it is probably only in
exceptional cases that non-compliance could be challenged in court with any
chance of success." Everling, Legal Problems of the Common Commercial Policy
in the European Economic Community, 4 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 141, 148
(1966).
8. See Comit6 intergouvernemental crd6 par la Confdrence de Messine,
RAPPORT DES CHEFS DE DELEGATION AUX MINISTRES DES AFFAIRES
ETRANGERES 75 (1956). For a further consideration of the relation of the CCP
and the common customs tariff see I. FRANK, THE EUROPEAN COMMON
MARKET: AN ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL POLICY (1961).
9. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 9.
10. For a consideration of theory behind a customs union see J. MEADE,
THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS (1955); J. VINER, THE CUSTOMS
UNION ISSUE (1950).
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Even in the early stages of its development, the Common Market
has led to a shift in the flow of world trade. With the removal of
internal trade barriers within the Community, there has been a
displacement effect stemming from a diversion of imports from third
countries to other member states. Countering this to a certain extent
has been the dynamic effect such a large market has produced in terms
of growth, increasing economies of scale, higher productivity and in
subsequent stimulation of trade with third countries." In this latter
sense, the economic basis of the Common Market is "conducive to the
expansion of trade on a basis of multilateralism and nondiscrimina-
tion .. ."12
Although the establishment of the common external tariff will
encounter serious obstacles, its development is indispensable not only
to the initial implementation of the economic theory of the customs
union but also to the realization of a viable CCP. Within the customs
union, competition will be dislocated and distorted if member states
are permitted to continue to formulate independently their policies
toward third countries in other areas of common commercial concern.
Referring to the relationship between a common tariff and other trade
policies, M. Deniau of the European Commission has stated:
[R] elations with non-member countries do not depend solely on tariffs, and
it seemed to us necessary to provide also for the co-ordination of trade
policies in the broadest sense, with a view to the gradual establishment of a
common trade policy .... [I] t is essential to agree on action vis-a-vis the
outside world, and in particular vis-a-vis countries whose competitive
conditions are very different from ours .... [I] f the external policies of the
Community countries are widely different in this respect, quite severe
dislocation can take place within the Community itself. If unity is not
attained in this respect, the implementation of the internal provisions of the
Treaty will be fraught with difficulty.1
3
Accordingly, in the formation of the Common Market, the common
external tariff "must at the same time be combined with a common
commercial policy vis-a-vis non-member countries."' 4 The inescapable
imperative is that member states of the Common Market must be
11. See N. KALDER, DESTINY OR DELUSION 59 (1971).
12. C. WILCox, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 71 (1949).
13. Deniau, The Objectives and Constitutional Structure of the European
Economic Community, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN Eco-
NOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION
(1960).
14. Quin, The Establishment of the Customs Union, in 1 AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE
101 (E. Stein & T. Nicholson eds. 1960).
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prepared to transfer to the Community the power to regulate the
external tariff as well as other commercial matters that affect trade
between the Community and third countries."5
Like the development of a common external tariff, the implementa-
tion of a nation's foreign policy is inextricably related to the growth
of a common commercial policy. 16 The necessity of these parallel
developments is perhaps best illustrated by an examination of the
economic consequences of a totally integrated Common Market. From
six nation-state economies the Common Market has created an
internal market of 190 million people, producing a gross national
product of 485 billion dollars. At present, this customs union
represents the world's foremost trading power, accounting for roughly
twenty per cent of world trade. With the accession of Denmark,
Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom, the Common Market will
account for nearly 27 per cent of world trade and will represent an
internal market of over 255 million people.11
The economic impact of the Common Market, even in its initial
stages of development, has led to an increase in tensions in the
international political sphere. A prime example is the increasingly
protective relationship between the United States and the Common
Market since the early 1960's. On a political level the United States
remains committed to supporting European integration." The eco-
nomic relations between the two trading blocs, however, have shown
signs of deterioration over the past decade because of the United
States view of the Community as a protectionist organization whose
enlargement damages American commercial interests.19 The general
15. "[I]t is impossible to set up a customs union and to transfer authority
over tariffs to the Community, without at the same time giving the Community
authority to decide as to quantitative restrictions.... However, when the main
instruments of commercial policy, in the shape of tariffs and quotas, have been
handed over to the Community, there appears to be little point in leaving the
competence to take other commercial measures in the hands of the member
States." Wohlfarth, The European Economic Community and World Trade, in
THE EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE 1, 6-7 (British Inst. of Int'l & Comp. L.,
Spec. Pub. No. 7, 1965).
16. See N. PALMER & H. PERKINS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ch. 6
(1957).
17. For statistics see European Community Information Service, Press Release
No. 8 (Jan. 22, 1972).
18. See Rogers, Our Permanent Interests in Europe, 10 ATL. COMMUNITY
Q. 21 (1972).
19. See, e.g., THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:
THEIR COMMON INTEREST 3 (European Community's Information Service,
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impression of the United States view resulting from the conflict
between its apparent political policy and its actual economic aims is
that the United States is no longer willing to accept immediate
economic losses for long-term political advantages.
2 0
The removal of trade barriers between member states and the
imposition of a common external tariff against third countries
necessarily restricts the flexibility of commercial dealings with
nonmember states. Not only would political conflict develop among
the member states if they were permitted to carry on independent
national commercial policies, but the Community could not function
as a credible economic unit if the member states retained the power to
deal with third countries in matters of commerce.2 In view of the
consequences of political autonomy in commercial dealings of the
member states, it is evident that they must be willing to surrender the
ultimate control over their commercial policies to the Community:
[c] ommercial policy is the central part of a political unit's activities in the
field of foreign economic relations, and as such of the greatest importance
for its existence and development in the modem world.22
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CCP
A. Legal Foundations
The legal framework for the CCP is found in the Treaty of Rome,
articles 110-16. These articles form a separate chapter that deals
specifically with the establishment of a common commercial policy
1971): "[T]he talk today in Washington and in Brussels and other European
capitals is not of grand design for Atlantic partnership. It is the ugly talk of trade
war. Each side damns the other for firing the first shots and threatens reprisals."
20. See REPORT ON EUROPEAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS: TRADE
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Eur. Consult. Ass., 23d Sess., Doc. No. 2937 (April 27, 1971) [hereinafter cited as
Destremau Report].
21. "If the EEC wants to avoid the risk of becoming a shapeless mass and if it
wishes to prove itself in the eyes of the outside world, it must show a minimum of
unity and, in particular, introduce a common customs tariff. But a tariff of this
kind cannot remain static. The Community must be able to change it, either by
independent action or by agreements concluded with third countries. This is
already one step towards a commercial policy. It also means that one assumes that
the Community possesses legal personality." Le Tallec, The Common Commercial
Policy of the EEC, 20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 733 (1971).
22. Everling, supra note 7, at 142.
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within the Community.2" A brief synopsis of these articles provides a
useful preview of CCP implementation and a procedural framework
for subsequent analysis.
Article 110 introduces the main theme and direction of the CCP. As
previously discussed, this article commits the member states to
contribute "to the harmonious development of world trade."2 4
Article 111, which is concerned with the CCP during the transitional
period, provides:
Member States shall coordinate their commercial relations with third
countries so as to bring about, by the end of the transitional period, the
conditions necessary for the implementation of a common policy in the
field of external trade.
Article 112 deals with export aids to third countries. This article
requires that aid granted by the various member states shall be
gradually harmonized by the end of the transitional period "to the
extent necessary to ensure that competition between enterprises
within the Community shall not be distorted." In this matter the
Community is empowered to issue directives to the member states to
insure compliance.
Article 113 forms the legal heart of the CCP in the post-transitional
period. This article treats both autonomous-internal Community
measures-and contractual-commercial agreements with third coun-
tries-aspects of the Community's commercial policy. Article 114
supplements the previous provisions by presenting the procedure for
concluding commercial agreements on behalf of the Community.
25
Article 115 is essentially a safeguard clause to protect member
states from economic difficulties that may result from disparities
among the measures taken by the member states in implementing the
CCP. During the transitional period, member states may take
autonomous action, subject to subsequent approval by the Commis-
sion, in cases of "urgency"; in the post-transitional period, however,
the Commission alone is authorized to take the steps necessary to
23. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, tit. II, ch. 3, arts. 110-16. Other direct and
indirect references to commercial policy are found in the preamble and articles
3(b), 9, 10, 18, 25, 27, 28 and 29.
24. Everling, supra note 7.
25. "The agreements referred to in Article 111(2) and in Article 113 shall be
concluded by the Council on behalf of the Community, during the first two stages
unanimously and subsequently by qualified majority." Treaty of Rome, supra
note 2, art. 114.
26. "In selecting such measure priority shall be given to those which cause the
least disturbance to the operation of the Common Market and which take into
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avoid diversion of trade or other economic difficulties arising from the
CCP. 2 6
Article 116 extends the principles of common action and uniform
policy to the role of the member states "within the framework of
international organizations of an economic character." In the post-
transitional period, this common action shall be put into effect by
decisions of the Council of Ministers.
27
B. Substantive Content
Article 113 provides an indication of the substantive content of
commercial policy. The first paragraph of the article deals with both
autonomous and contractual aspects of the Community's commercial
policy:
After the expiry of the transitional period the common commercial policy
shall be based on uniformly established principles, particularly in regard to
tariff amendments, to the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, to the
establishing of uniform practice as regards measures of liberalization, to
export policy and to commercial protective measures including measures to
be taken in cases of dumping or subsidies.
According 'to article 113 the autonomous aspects can be divided
roughly into those measures affecting import policy, those concerning
the formation of an export policy, and certain defensive commercial
measures "to be taken in cases of dumping or subsidies." As to the
contractual relations of the Community under the CCP, article 113
contains specific reference only to the conclusions of "tariff and trade
agreements." 28  The article provides neither any indication of the
nature or content of these agreements nor a timetable for implementa-
tion.
A careful reading of article 113(1) indicates clearly, however, that
the measures specified are only illustrative, and not exhaustive,
indications of what the CCP is to embrace in the post-transitional
period.2 9 This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that the list of
implementation measures under article 113(1) is prefaced by the word
account the necessity for expediting, as far as possible, the introduction of the
common customs tariff." Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 115.
27. For a further consideration of the bases of the CCP see Pescatore, La
politique commerciale, in LES NOUVELLES: DROIT DES COMMUNAUTES
EUROPEENNES 917,919-31 (1968).
28. For an analysis of this phrase "tariff and trade agreements" see Section V
B infra.
29. "Since the enumeration of activities in article 113 is introduced by the
word 'particularly,' it can be assumed that this enumeration is not exhaustive.
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"particularly." Professor Waelbroeck provides perhaps the most
accurate analysis when he refers to "commercial policy" under article
113 as an unbestimmter Rechtsbegriff--an undefined concept of
law.
30
The purview of this commercial policy has been the subject of
considerable discussion. At one extreme, those holding views similar
to Professor Brinkhorst suggest that in the post-transitional period the
notion of commercial policy would embrace not only those matters
relating to the movement of goods but also such matters as the flow of
services, and the right of establishment and transport.3 1 Countering
this assertion is Everling's view, which appears to be the currently
accepted position of the Council of Ministers. Everling argues that
such matters as establishment, transport and capital movements do
not fall under the CCP, because they are dealt with by the Treaty of
Rome under sections separate and distinct from those concerning
commercial policy.32 Everling appears to accept without question,
however, the proposition that the movement of services would fall
under the CCP, even though this position seems to contradict his basic
premise that those areas of the Treaty of Rome covered in sections
distinct from those concerning commercial policy are not within the
purview of the CCP. In addition, agricultural products, services and
the establishment of the external tariff are matters also covered in
separate sections of the Treaty, and yet are acceptable to Everling as
matters covered by the CCP. These inconsistencies seem to indicate,
therefore, that the crucial factor in distinguishing those matters
covered by article 113 cannot be simply the order and place of
treatment in the various sections of the Treaty of Rome. Subsequent
sections of this article will discuss why the differentiating element
should be the relationship of particular implementation measures to
the flow of the Community's external trade.
Consequently, measures such as the regulation of export and import prices, the
establishment of quotas, the determination of conditions for export transactions,
the issuance of currency regulations for commercial transactions with third states,
matters concerned with tourist trade, and others also fall within the competence
of the Community." Feld, The Competences of the European Communities for
the Conduct of External Relations, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 891, 901 (1965).
30. See Lauwaars, The External Relations of the Unified European Com-
munity, 5 COMM. MET. L. REV. 346, 347 (1968). The first topic of
consideration at the Colloquium concerned the international personality of the
Community; the second dealt with the common commercial policy of the
Community. The Institute prepared and published a Cahier de documentation of
some four volumes treating the topics discussed during the Colloquium.
31. Id. at 346-47.
32. See Everling, supra note 7, at 150.
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Another textual problem posed by article 113 centers around the
clause, "the common commercial policy shall be based on uniformly
established principles." As Pescatore has pointed out, this language
admits of an ambiguity because it does not make clear whether the
commercial policy should be "unconditionally common or if it is to
be reduced merely to the formulation of common principles, the
working out of which is to be reserved to the member states."3 3 In
the context of implementing a "common policy" the use of the phrase
"uniformly established principles" would appear to be redundant. An
argument based on this language could lead to a conclusion that the
development of the CCP is to be more a harmonization of national
policies by the member states themselves than a genuine coordination
on the Community level.3 4
When article 113 is read in conjunction with article 111 and the
broad purposes of the Treaty of Rome, however, it becomes difficult
to envisage the implementation of the common commercial policy
simply on the level of cooperation among member states.3 5 One of
the earlier reports issued to carry out the Treaty's terms, the
Community's Action Program for the Common Commercial Policy of
1962, continually emphasized the preeminence of Community institu-
tions in achieving the CCP;3 6 moreover, as stated previously, the
Treaty itself stipulates a primary objective of the Community as the
"establishment of a common customs union and of a common
commercial policy toward third countries." Both of these goals must
be regarded as measures that can be implemented only at the
Community level.3 7 This conclusion also is supported by the fact that
article 111 discusses the coordination of commercial relations by the
member states during the transitional period specifically in terms of
the Community policy and procedure to be followed.3" Finally,
33. Pescatore, supra note 27, at 926.
34. As noted by Wolhfarth, however, "[t]he common commercial policy...
is not simply a co-ordinated commercial policy of the member States, but a
commercial policy which is decided upon and is put into effect by the Council of
Ministers and the Commission." Wolhfarth, supra note 15, at 7.
35. For further discussion see Everling, supra note 7, at 150-52.
36. See Programme d'action en matiere politique commerciale, 1962 E.E.C.
J.0. 2353 [hereinafter cited as CCP Action Program]. An English translation of
the Program is available in 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 3816 (1962).
37. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 3(b).
38. "The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council as regards the
procedure to be followed during the transitional period in order to achieve
common action and as regards the achievement of a uniform commercial policy."
Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 111(1).
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article 113 stipulates expressly that the Community's institutions are
solely responsible for putting the CCP into effect.3 9 Therefore, the
substance of both article 111 and article 113 appears to support the
view that "an effective commercial policy cannot be pursued
successfully in the present world situation, except by the Community
as such."4
The most plausible explanation of the terminology of article 113(1)
is offered by several writers who suggest that the phrase "uniformly
established principles" was employed in order to leave the Council of
Ministers a degree of discretion in dealing with the implementation of
a common policy in the matter of external trade.4 1 If integration is to
be viewed as a "process, ' 42 however, and if Community claims of
moving toward a complete economic union are ever to be realized,43
then this political option eventually must be foreclosed in favor of a
genuine Community approach.
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE COP
A. Autonomous Community Acts-Import Policy
In proposing certain procedures for attaining uniformity in the
commercial policies of the member states toward third countries, the
1962 CCP Action Program deals with the CCP under two major
headings-import policy and export policy. This same categorization
will be used hereinafter in analyzing the various autonomous or
unilateral acts taken by the Community in implementing the CCP.
39. No reference is made in the text of article 113 to the role to be played by
the member states themselves in the post-transitional period.
40. See Proposition 23 de resolution sur l'instauration progressive de ]a
politique commerciale commune, in Rapport fait au nom de ]a commission du
commerce exterieur sur l'instauration progressive de la politique commerciale
commune, [1965-1966] EUR. PARL. Docs., No. 3, at 19 [hereinafter cited as
Hahn Report].
41. "A partir de ce moment, les 6changes 6conomique ext6rieurs de ]a
Communaut6 seront regis par une politique commun 'fond6e sur des principes
uniformes.' La formule choisie par les auteurs du trait6, que nous venons de citer,
semble indiquer que seuls les principes fondamentaux, les grandes lignes de cette
politique, seront communs, ce qui laisserait aux Etats membres une certaine
latitude pour la mise en oeuvre des directives arret6es en commun." Pescatore, Les
relations ext~rieures des Communaut~s europ~ennes, in LES NOUVELLES:
DROIT DES COMMUNAUTES EUnOPEENNES 89-90 (1968).
42. See generally E. NAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE (1958).
43. See Report to the Council and Commission on the Realization by Stages
of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community (Oct. 8, 1970) (supplement
to 3 BULL. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, No. 11, 1970).
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Three essential concerns of the Community in developing a uniform
import policy are the customs tariff, quantitative restrictions and
certain defensive measures. 4 As provided by the Treaty of Rome, a
common customs tariff, the establishment of which is causally linked
to the successful implementation of the Community's CCP, "shall be
applied in its entirety at latest upon the expiry of the transitional
period."4 The Treaty stipulates that the common customs tariff is to
be imposed gradually during the transitional period, and at the end of
this period the tariff "shall be established at the arithmetical average
of the duties applied in the four customs territories comprised in the
Community [Benelux, France, Germany and Italy] ."46
A full eighteen months ahead of schedule, the common customs
tariff came into effect on July 1, 1968.11 Concerning this event,
Homan has noted:
In their judgment on the external tariffs of the EEC's customs union critics
mostly take it for granted that this union now has lower tariffs than have
the United Kingdom and the United States, as an average. They often forget
that the customs union includes two countries, France and Italy, which
before had been protectionist in their trade policy. They also forget that the
gradual decrease of the EEC tariffs since they were set up in 1958, was not
only due to the Dillon round and Kennedy round negotiations, but also to
unilateral decisions.4
44. "The diverstiy of national import systems resulting either from indepen-
dent provisions concerning foreign trade or from bilateral trade agreements with
certain non-member countries is incompatible with the proper operation of a
genuine customs and economic union. For the difference in the level of
liberalisation of imports causes certain products or products from certain
countries to be excluded from the freedom of movement. Distortions and checks
at internal frontiers in the Community resulting from the disparity of national
systems must therefore be eliminated by introduction of Community systems."
The Communities Work Programme 10 (March 20, 1969) (supplement to 2 BULL.
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, No. 4, 1969).
45. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 23(3).
46. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 19(1). Note, however, that following
the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds of worldwide tariff negotiations under the
GATT, this tariff was substantially reduced from its original level (the arithmetical
average of duties of the member states as of Jan. 1, 1957).
47. For a general discussion on the common customs tariff see Mennens, The
Common Customs Tariff of the European Economic Community, I J. WORLD
TRADE LAW 73 (1967).
48. Homan, The EEC and the World Economy, 5 J. WORLD TRADE LAW
509, 513 (1971).
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Any amendments to this tariff shall be based upon "uniformly
established principles" and are a direct concern of the CCP.4 9
Articles 30-37 of the Treaty of Rome concern the elimination of
quantitative restrictions and "measures having equivalent effect"
among the member states of the Community. The CCP is concerned
with the "liberalization"-the suppression or reduction-of these
quantitative restrictions on imports from third countries."0 Article
111(5) calls for "uniformization" at the highest level possible in the
liberalization process, and articles 111(1) and 113(1) provide for the
"uniformization" of quota policies.
One of the first indications of a procedure for implementation is
found in a 1961 Council decision that proposed a system of
consultation to inform other member states and the EEC Commission
of a member state's plan "to undertake a modification of its program
of liberalization with regard to third countries."' 1 The most extensive
treatment, however, of the Community's procedural approach to a
"liberalization" policy is outlined in the 1962 CCP Action Program.
The 1962 Program dealt with two different aspects of the import
liberalization process: those situations in which imports originated in
member countries of GATT or third countries that follow the
principles of GATT, and those in which they originated from
countries with foreign trade policies that are not based on GATT. The
procedure followed during the transitional period in order to deal
with the former situation was to be carried out on two levels.
"Uniformization" of national liberalization lists was to be achieved on
a geographic level and according to the type of product involved.5 2
When the Council of Ministers had ascertained that "sufficient
uniformity has been achieved, it [would], upon proposal of the
Commission, and according to the procedure of Article 111, para-
graphs 1 and 3, decide on the formulation of a common liberalization
liSt."5 3
49. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 113(1).
50. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 113(1).
51. See D6cision du 9 octobre 1961, concernant une procedure de consulta-
tions sur les n~gociations des accords relatifs aux relations commerciales des Etats
membres avec les pays tiers et sur les modifications du r~gime de lib6ration h
l'6gard des pays tiers, 1961 E.E.C. J.O. 1273.
52. On the geographical level, the aim was to ameliorate the discrimination
between the terms applied to the countries of the earlier OEEC on the one hand
and the countries of the Dollar Zone on the other. This liberalization would be
extended to other GATT countries except for those with abnormally low
production costs.
53. CCP Action Program, supra note 36, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para.
3816 (1) (1962).
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Despite persistent encouragement from the European Assembly,
however, 4 the Council of Ministers did not enact its first regulations
on the "uniformization" of liberalization until the end of 1968. On
December 10 of that year, the Council promulgated three regulations
concerning the establishment of a common liberalization list,55 the
gradual institution of a common procedure on the management of
quantitative restrictions, 6 and the establishment of a special pro-
cedure for the imports of specific products from certain third
countries.
5 7
Essentially, regulation 2041/688 consolidated the lists of products
that had been liberalized previously in all the member states. This
regulation requires member states to abstain from introducing
quantitative restrictions on imported products covered by a common
list consisting of approximately 800 customs headings. The coverage
of the regulation is further restricted, however, to those products
imported from the third countries designated on an annex. 9 In
addition, quantitative restrictions on such products can be imposed by
member states only in cases of "urgency." Even then, however, the
Commission must be notified immediately and the Council of
Ministers may subsequently decide to approve, modify or abrogate
these restrictions.60 These obligations under the regulation are not
binding on member states in the following cases: (1) when the
member state introduces the restriction on imports from other
member states in conformity with the Treaty of Rome; (2) when the
member state introduces the restriction in conformity with articles
108 and 109 of the Treaty of Rome in order to deal with balance of
payments problems; and (3) when the member state applies such
54. See generally Hahn Report, supra note 40.
55. R~glement No. 2041/68, du 10 d~cembre 1968, portant 6tablissement
d'une liste commune de liberation des importations dans la Communaut6 i l'dgard
des pays tiers, 1968 E.E.C. J.0. L303/1 [hereinafter cited as Regulation
2041/68].
56. R~glement No. 2043/68, du 10 d~cembre 1968, portant 6tablissement
graduel d'une procedure commune de gestion des contingents quantitatifs a
l'importation dans la Communaut4, 1968 E.E.C. J.0. L303/39 [hereinafter cited
as Regulation 2043/68].
57. R6glement No. 2045/68, du 10 d6cembre 1968, instaurant une procedure
speciale pour l'importation de certains produits de certains pays tiers, 1968 E.E.C.
J.0. L303/43 [hereinafter cited as Regulation 2045/68].
58. This regulation is not applicable to the state-trading nations of Eastern
Europe.
59. Regulation 2041/68, supra note 55, art. 2.
60. Regulation 2041/68, supra note 55, art. 6.
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restrictions because of obligations arising from multilateral or bilateral
agreements to which it is a signatory."'
Regulation 2041/68 also empowers the Council, acting by a
qualified majority and upon a proposal by the Commission, to include
additional products in the common list, provided that such an
addition would not seriously prejudice the interests of the Community
or the member states.62 The Council may also withdraw products
from the list when market disturbances take place or threaten to
occur.6" These actions must not, however, hinder the performance of
Community agreements with third countries or the application of
regulations concerning the common agricultural policy."'
Regulation 2043/68 of December 10, 1968, outlines a highly
technical Community procedure for the administration of import
quotas specified either unilaterally or by Community agreements. In
essence, this regulation attempts to create a distribution of quotas by
the Community among member states for imports not covered by the
liberalization list. To deal effectively with products not on the
common liberalization list, however, the Community must be substi-
tuted as a contracting party for the member states in the bilateral and
multilateral agreements that create the import quota. It should also be
granted the power to invoke quantitative restrictions either unilateral-
ly or by convention."
Article 2(1) of regulation 2043/68 provides further that the
Council, acting on a proposal by the Commission, is to decide "in
principle" what the Community quota should be and how it is to be
imposed in the respective member states. This allocation may be
changed to facilitate use of the quota and to create a common reserve
of products to be distributed at a later date.66
Within the three months following the Council's decision the
member states are required to make known by official publication the
imports that are to be authorized by license and the conditions
governing such authorization.6 7 A Quota Management Committee,
comprised of representatives from the member states and presided
over by a Commission representative, is given an ostensive power to
61. Regulation 2041/68, supra note 55, art. 7.
62. Regulation 2041/68, supra note 55, art. 3.
63. Regulation 2041/68, supra note 55, art. 4.
64. Regulation 2041/68, supra note 55, art. 8. This regulation took effect on
January 1, 1969; it has since been replaced by a subsequent Council regulation.
65. See Kim, The Common Commercial Policy of the EEC: Quantitative
Restriction and Import Control, 4 J. WORLD TRADE LAw 20, 30 (1970).
66. Regulation 2043/68, supra note 56, art. 2.
67. Regulation 2043/68, supra note 56, art. 5.
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decide details of these license awards, such as the nature and amount
of Community quota, adjustments of quotas or the use of any
common quota reserve. 8 This Committee is required, however, to act
in agreement with the Commission, and any disputed decisions are to
be submitted to the Council for resolution.6 9
The third regulation, No. 2045/68, was also promulgated on
December 10, 1968. It outlines a special supervisory procedure, for
certain items already liberalized, that may precipitate a situation
adverse to Community interests and present difficulties in assigning
quotas. This procedure allows prompt Community intervention
whenever it is necessitated by an undesirable situation." ° Another
purpose of this regulation is to establish a system of supervision for a
de facto liberalization phase for "non-sensitive" items prior to their
full liberalization. 7
These three import regulations of December 10, 1968, were by
their very nature interim steps toward a unified Community import
policy. In 1970 they were replaced by three other import regulations:
one establishing a common import system with third countries that
are members of GATT or follow that agreement's principles,72
another providing a common procedure for the administration of
Community quotas, 3 and a third dealing with state-trading coun-
tries.74  As pointed out by the Commission of the European
Communities:
The new arrangements do not make any change in the basically liberal
common commercial policy, but streamline old machinery which was rather
cumbersome and replace it by a more flexible and, particularly, a more
"Community" procedure, based on close cooperation between the Commis-
68. Regulation 2043/68, supra note 56, art. 9.
69. Regulation 2043/68, supra note 56, art. 10.
70. Regulation 2045/68, supra note 57, art. 162.
71. Regulation 2045/68, supra note 57, arts. 9-13 (concerning the Com-
munity procedures under the regulation).
72. R~glement No. 1023/70, du 25 mai 1970, portant 6tablissement d'une
proc4dure commune de gestion des contingents quantitatifs, 1970 E.E.C. J.O.
L124/1 [hereinafter cited as Regulation 1023/70].
73. R1glement No. 1025170, du 25 mai 1970, portant 6tablissement d'un
r~gime commun applicable aux importations de pays tiers, 1970 E.E.C. J.0.
L124/6 [hereinafter cited as Regulation 1025/70].
74. R~glement No. 109/70, du 19 d4cembre 1969, portant 4tablissement d'un
r~gime commun applicable aux importations de pays A commerce d'Etat, 1970
E.E.C. J.0. L19/1.
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sion and the national authorities. They also provide for a considerable
widening of the geographical scope of the system.
75
Regulation 1023/70, which is applicable to both imports and
exports, sets out the common procedure for administering quantita-
tive quotas fixed unilaterally by the Community or by agreement with
nonmember countries. The previous notion of a "Community reserve"
has not been retained in the present regulation. Instead, a member
state may request an enlargement of its national share, or an
amendment of its allocation of the total quota; if the Commission
does not reply to the request within three weeks, the state may itself
authorize additional imports up to twenty per cent of their originally
assessed quotas.7 6
The main emphasis of the regulation continues to be that the
Community has the primary role in the management of quotas.
Accordingly, the Council, acting on a Commission proposal and by a
qualified majority, fixes the total quota for the entire Community and
determines the criteria by which the quota will be distributed among
the member states.1 7 The Commission, in conjunction with the Quota
Management Committee, is responsible for the actual allocation of the
quota shares and for allowing any increase in the total quota.78 As in
the previous regulations, however, the issuance of import licenses and
other formalities are still primarily the concern of the member
states.
79
Concerning the compatibility of such a system of national quota
shares with the free exchange of goods within the Community, Kim
has observed:
Such a form of distribution of quotas thus seems to present an obstacle to
the freedom of economic exchange among the member States. An
investigation at Community level into all the economic factors in the
situation of the markets in the member States for the products in question,
and the arrangement of the quota, when its establishment is decided, for the
Community as a whole, would no doubt be the only effective and valid
solution.
8 0
75. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTH GEN-
ERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITIES 1970, AT 331
(1971).
76. Regulation 1023/70, supra note 72, art. 4.
77. Regulation 1023/70, supra note 72, art. 2.
78. Regulation 1023/70, supra note 72, art. 11.
79. Regulation 1023/70, supra note 72, arts. 4-6.
80. Kim, Developments in the Commercial Policy of the European Communi-
ty, 8 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 152 (1971).
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Regulation 1023/70 requires the Council of Ministers, acting on a
Commission proposal, to decide by the end of 1972 what necessary
adaptation should be made in order "fully to guarantee that, within
the limits of the fixed quota, import or export transactions can be
achieved at the same time throughout the Community.""1
Regulation 1025/70, which concerns the establishment of a
common import system with third countries that are members of
GATT or follow GATT principles, has extended the previous
liberalization list to more than 900 customs headings."s Additional
headings may be added by a decision of the Council, acting upon a
Commission proposal and by a qualified majority.83
The regulation also provides certain procedural safeguards against
the importation of products that might be prejudicial to the interests
of Community producers. Briefly, when a member state gives notice
to the Commission that the importation of a certain product is
creating serious danger to one of its producers, this information must
be communicated immediately to the other member states.84 There-
after, upon the request of a member state or the Commission, a
consultative procedure is initiated to provide an evidentiary basis for
examining the "economic and commercial situation of the product in
question."8 " When in fact such a product is found to prejudice the
interests of the Community or its producers, the Commission is to set
up a further system to supervise the circulation of this product among
the member states. 86 Finally, if the importation of the product into
the Community continues at a significantly increasing rate or seriously
disrupts the marketing of similar products, safeguard measures may be
taken by the Council, acting on a Commission proposal and by a
qualified majority.8 Certain provisions are also made concerning
81. Regulation 1025/70, supra note 73, art. 14.
82. Regulation 1025/70, supra note 73, annex I.
83. Regulation 1025/70, supra note 73, art. 2.
84. Regulation 1025/70, supra note 73, art. 3.
85. Regulation 1025/70, supra note 73, arts. 4 & 5.
86. Regulation 1025/70, supra note 73, arts. 7-9. Note that the Commission
decides whether this system should come into force against the given product.
Any member state, however, may within ten days bring the case before the
Council of Ministers, which has the power to abrogate the Commission decision.
The system is entirely supervisory. Products under the system must have an
import document issued by the member states, which shows the following
information: name and address of importer, country of origin, c.i.f. price free at
frontier, the quantity, and the anticipated dates for importation. Under article
8(2) the document can be used only for a maximum period determined at the
same time and under the same procedures stipulated at the beginning of the
supervision for the given product.
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emergency measures that can be taken by the Commission and the
member states."8
Regulation 109/70 provides for the first Community system
regulating imports from certain state-trading countries by applying the
same principles applied to imports from countries under the GATT. 9
Provision is made for the consolidation of customs headings presently
liberalized through the Community, vis-A-vis the Eastern European
countries of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and
the U.S.S.R.; the list of headings concerning these state-trading
countries contains far fewer items, however, than those under
regulation 2041/68.90 Headings may be added by decision of the
Council of Ministers, 9 but a safeguard procedure paralleling that
stipulated under regulation 1025/70 is also provided. 92 Although the
bulk of trade is conducted under independent agreements, this
regulation has at least coordinated the trade relations between
member states and the Eastern European countries.
B. Common Export Policy
Article 113(1) of the Treaty of Rome states that, at the end of the
transitional period, "export policy" in the Community shall be based
on uniform principles. No further explanation is offered concerning
the meaning of "export policy." It has been noted, however, that
"[t]he execution of a common policy for exports presents less
difficulties than for imports since the number of products that are not
liberated has become negligible."'9 3 For the EEC, a common export
87. Regulation 1025/70, supra note 73, art 11. Under article 10 the
Commission may take certain emergency measures if required.
88. Regulation 1025/70, supra note 73, art. 12.
89. Examples include "uniformization" through liberalization, consolidation
of liberalization, shift of decision-making powers to the Community for liberated
customs headings, and the establishment of uniform procedures for additional
subsequent headings.
90. Regulation 109/70, annex. This annex contains fewer than 500 customs
headings. The discrepancy that existed between those liberalized products vis.h.vis
Russia and other state-trading countries (due to West Germany's relations with the
U.S.S.R. at the time) was eliminated at the end of 1970. See Regulation 234/71,
1971 E.E.C. J.0. L281.
91. See, e.g., Riglement No. 2172/70, due octobre 1970, 6tendant a d'autres
importations 'annexe du R~glement No. 109/70 portant 6tablissement d'un
r~gime commun applicalbe aux importations de pays a commerce d'Etat, 1970
E.E.C. J.0. L239/1.
92. See Regulation 109/70, titles IMIV.
93. Kim, The Developments in the Commercial Policy of the European
Economic Community, 8 COMM. MKT. L. RE V. 158-59 (1971).
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policy has evolved as a result of the enactment of regulation 2603/69
by the Council of Ministers on December 20, 1969. The regulation
established a common system on exports9 4 and endeavored to
implement one of the prime objectives sought by the 1962 CCP
Action Program: "extension of liberalization to all third countries,
except for products for which genuine difficulties might arise within
the Community.""5 This regulation also institutes a procedure for
enacting Community safeguard measures when Community interests
may be endangered; the procedure is analogous to that under
regulation 1025/70 concerning the common system on imports. 96
As stressed by the Commission of the European Communities:
The disparities which exist between the national export assistance systems
are liable to distort competition among enterprises in the Community. It
therefore appears necessary, in conjunction with the development of the
common trade policy, to give coherence to the national export credit and
export guarantee systems.
97
The need for a harmonization of national aids granted on exports to
third countries during the transitional period is recognized in article
112 of the Treaty of Rome. According to article 113, these aids are to
be based in the post-transitional period on "uniformly established
principles."9'
Recognizing that export credits and guarantees can be used to
create highly favorable conditions for various exports, the Council
decided as early as 1960 to set up "a group for coordinating credit
insurance policies, guarantees and financial credits." Essentially, the
94. R~glement No. 2603/69, du 20 d4cembre 1969, portant 6tablissement
d'un r6gime commun applicable aux exportations, 1969 E.E.C. J.O. L324/25
[hereinafter cited as Regulation 2603/69]. This system was applicable to all but
60 of the 1097 customs headings. Council Regulation No. 234/71 of Feb. 1,
1971, however, deleted certain products from the liberalization list appended to
Regulation 2603/69.
95. CCP Action Program, supra note 36, § B (2). The regulation applies to
agricultural exports already subject to the Community's common agricultural
policy in only a "complementary manner." Regulation 2603/69, supra note 94,
art. 12 (1). On the nature and scope of the common agricultural policy see 2 J.
MEGRET, LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTE EcONoMIQUE EUROPEENNE,
(1970); Norton, The Heart of the Matter: The Problem of Agriculture, the U.K.
and the E.E.C., 6 TEXAS INT'L L.F. 221 (1971).
96. Regulation 2603/69, supra note 94, art. 6-9.
97. The Communities' Work Programme; Programme for the Next Three
Years; Essential Tasks for 1969 at 10 (supplement to 2 BULL. EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, April, 1969).
98. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 113(1).
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function of this group was one of research and advice to the
Council.99 In 1962 the Council enacted a decision to establish a
consultation procedure for this "group, ''0°  which was subsequently
revised in 1965.1
It was not until 1970, however, that the Community gave evidence
of a determined effort to harmonize export aid policy. On October
27, 1970, the Council of Ministers adopted two directives-No.
70/509 and No. 70/510-pursuant to article 113 of the Treaty of
Rome. Both directives deal with common credit insurance policies for
medium and long-term transactions by public and private pur-
chasers.1 "2 On December 16, 1970, the Council passed a decision
pertaining to export guarantees and financing for certain subcon-
tracts;'0 3 and on February 1, 1971, it enacted a directive concerning
the harmonization of essential matters regarding guarantees for
short-term transactions involving public and private purchasers.'0 4
Credit insurance is a significant factor in international competition
because of the importance of export credits. Because the risks
connected with certain selling operations are assumed by private firms
only, credit firm guarantees, on the state's behalf or with its backing,
are being used increasingly.' 05 The two Council directives of October
99. D6cision du Conseil, du 27 septembre 1960, portant institution d'un
Groupe de coordination des politiques d'assurance-cr~dit, des garanties et des
crddits financiers, 1960 E.E.C. J.0. 1339.
100. Decision du Conseil, du 15 mai 1962, portant 6tablissement d'une
procedure de consultations au sein du group6 de coordination des politiques
d'assurance-crddit, des garanties et des crddits financiers, 1962 E.E.C. J.0. 1561.
101. Decision du Conseil, du 26 janvier 1965, relative A la procedure de
consultations dans le domaines de l'assurance-cr~dit, des garanties et des credits
financiers, 1965 E.E.C. J.0. 255.
102. See Directive No. 70/509, du 27 octobre 1970, concernant l'adoption
d'une police commun d'assurance-cr6dit pour les operations A moyen et long
terme sur acheteurs publics, 1970 E.E.C. J.0. L254/1; and Directive No. 70/510,
du 27 octobre 1970, concernant l'adoption d'une police commune d'assurance-
credit pour les op6rations i moyen et long terme sur acheteurs priv~s, 1970
E.E.C. J.0. L254/26.
103. D6cision No. 70/552, du 16 d6cembre 1970, relative au r~gime
applicable, dans les domaines des garanties et des financements A l'exportation, i
certaines sous-traitances en provenance d'autres pays membres ou de pays non
membres des Communaut6 europ6ennes, 1970 E.E.C. J.0. L284/59.
104. Directive No. 71/86, du 1 fdvrier 1971, concernant l'harmonization des
dispositions essentielles en matikre de garantie des operations a court terme
(risque politique) sur acheteurs publics et sur acheteurs priv~s, 1971 E.E.C. J.0.
L36/14.
105. 3 BULL. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Dec. 1970, at 71.
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27, 1970, outline in general terms the steps to be taken by the
member states toward harmonizing export insurance techniques and
developing a Community policy toward export credits.
According to directives 70/509 and 70/510, the member states are
required to "take all legislative, regulative or administrative measures
necessary for putting into effect by September 1, 1971, a medium and
long-term common policy for public purchasers.1 10 6  The common
policies delineate the general terms under which the credit guarantee is
to be issued. In addition, the two directives treat such matters as the
nature and extent of the guarantee, the obligations of the insured
party, compensation, and miscellaneous matters." 7 The two direc-
tives differ because of the amendment of four articles in the directive
on private buyers, regarding the definition of hazard, cause of loss and
terms of compensation. 0 8 Under both directives each credit insurer
remains free to decide on special terms, in accordance with the
contracts made. In addition, under each of the directives a con-
sultative committee is to be established, composed of representatives
from the member states and presided over by a Commission
representative, to aid the Commission in solving the problems relating
to the uniform application of the directives.' 0 9
Directive 71/86 was designed to complement the first two directives
by attempting to harmonize short-term credit involving public and
private purchasers. Unlike the previous Council directives, this
directive merely sets forth certain basic principles to be adhered to by
the states under the supervision of the Council with assistance from
the Advisory Committee on Export Credit Insurance. The directive
does not take effect until satisfactory solutions are found on exchange
guarantees, financial credit and guarantees against rising costs." 0
Decision 70/552, which concerns the system of export guarantees
and financing for certain subcontracts from other member states and
third countries, covers subcontracts involving export transactions
concluded on the basis of private guaranteed credits."' The essential
provisions of the decision are also "applicable by analogy ... to
sub-contracts relating to export transactions concluded on the basis of
106. Directives 70/509 and 70/510, supra note 102, art. 1.
107. One of the questions dealt with is the exchange rates to be used when
converting amounts of foreign currency for compensation, recoveries, premiums
and expert's fees.
108. Directives 70/509 and 70/510, supra note 102, annex A.
109. Directive 70/509, supra note 102 arts. 4-6; Directive 70/510, supra note
102, art. 5.
110. 4 BULL. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, No. 4, at 112 (1970).
111. Decision 70/552, supra note 103, annex § I.
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Article 113(1) of the Treaty of Rome explicitly includes under the
CCP "commercial protective measures" to be taken in cases of
dumping or subsidies. Such measures are usually referred to as
antidumping measures and countervailing duties." 3 Although article
91 of the Treaty is a "dumping" provision, it pertains to only
intra-Community activity occurring during the- transitional period.
Article 113(1), on the other hand, applies to the area of external
Community trade in the post-transitional period.
Although the 1962 CCP Action Program called for a "uniformiza-
tion of actual trade protection measure[s]" and the Commission
submitted a draft regulation to the Council on this matter in 1963,114
the Council did not promulgate a Community antidumping regula-
tion until April 5, 1968." s This regulation was influenced by the
GATT Anti-Dumping Code, adopted in 1967 as a result of the
Kennedy Round of worldwide tariff negotiation.
1 1 6
As enacted, regulation 459/68 prohibits "dumping, premium, or
subsidy practices on the part of countries that are not members of the
Community" without prejudice to special rules contained in Com-
munity agreements with third countries and to obligations under
GATT. The regulation covers the movement of all goods, including
agricultural products.
1 7
112. Decision 70/552 supra note 103, art. 2.
113. On the general rationale behind these measures see Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Duties (GATT 1958), supplemented by GATT Document
MGT(59) 122 (1959).
114. See Proposition d'un r6glement du Conseil r6latif A la d6fense contre les
pratiques de dumping, primes ou subventions de la part de pays non membres de
la Communaut6 6conomiques europ~enne, 1966 E.E.C. J.O. 989.
115. R~glement No. 459/68, du 5 avril 1968, r6latif A la ddfense contre les
pratiques de dumping, primes ou subventions de la part de pays non membres de
la Communaut6 6conomique europ~enne, 1968 E.E.C. J.O. L93/1 [hereinafter
cited as Regulation 459/68].
116. See AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VI OF THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS.
(15th Supp. 1967) [hereinafter cited as GATT ANTI-DUMPING CODE]. For a
discussion of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code see Rehm, The Kennedy Round of
Trade Negotiations, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 427-34 (1968).
117. Regulation 459/68, supra note 115, art. 1.
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Before antidumping duties may be imposed, one of the following
conditions must be present: (1) actual dumping as defined by the
regulation;" 8 (2) material injury or the threat of material injury to
an established Community industry; or (3) substantial retardation of
the establishment of an industry whose creation is contemplated in
the Community." 9  Acting on behalf of a Community industry, any
interested party who contends that the above conditions are present
may file a written complaint with the member states where the injured
or threatened industry is situated. A copy of the complaint is
forwarded to the Commission. Alternatively, the complaint may be
made directly to the Commission and a copy sent to the member
states.
120
Once a complaint is deemed proper, a Community investigation
procedure is initiated by the Commission in order to determine the
existence of dumping and the nature of the resulting injury. The
Commission will hear the views of both the exporters and importers
involved, and may seek reassurances from the importers and exporters
concerning price revisions in order to avoid the imposition of
Community defense measures. The findings of the preliminary hearing
must be published in the Official Journal, and on the basis of these
published results any interested party may request a hearing. 12 1 If the
Commission decides to impose either temporary or final antidumping
measures, it will enact appropriate regulations.12 2 Regulation 459/69
also provides for the imposition of countervailing duties in order to
offset a subsidy or premium granted to a third country exporter that
results or is likely to result in material injury to an established
Community industry. It also applies if the premium is likely to retard
the creation of such a contemplated industry.
23
D. The Matter of Services
Another problem, which has been glossed over in the literature on
the CCP, is whether the movement of services to and from the
118. Regulation 459/68, supra note 115, art. 3 (1)(a): "A product introduced
on the Community market shall be considered as being dumped when the price of
the product exported to the Community is less than the comparable price, in the
ordinary course of trade, for a similar product, within the meaning of Article 5,
when destined for consumption in the country of origin or the country of
exportation."
119. Regulation 459/68, supra note 115, art. 2.
120. Regulation 459/68, supra note 115, art. 6.
121. See Regulation 459/68, supra note 115, arts. 8-14.
122. Regulation 459/68, supra note 115, art. 19.
123. See Regulation 459/68, supra note 115, arts. 22-25.
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Community would fall under the concept of commercial policy as
envisioned by the Treaty of Rome. An affirmative answer should not
be assumed. For example, services are explicitly excluded from
treatment under the GATT;'2 4 and the Community legislation and
agreements concluded under the CCP and articles 111 and 113 of the
Treaty of Rome do not mention the term "services."
In the opinion of this writer, however, "services" must necessarily
be included within the notion of a common commercial policy for the
Community for several reasons. First, subsequent to the creation of
the GATT in 1948, "services" have become an increasingly important
factor in the commercial life of the economically developed Western
nations. In fact, in the United States "services" are gradually replacing
"goods" in their importance to the growth of foreign trade. One
writer has even defined the economy of the United States as a
"service" economy.' 2-  With this increasing growth of the movement
of services in both the internal commercial development of the
Western countries and their international commercial contacts, "ser-
vices" should form a proper and integral part of the CCP. Secondly,
the movement of services is considered an essential item in computing
the current accounts on the balance of trade and payments figures by
the Western nations.1 2 6 Thirdly, in creating the conditions necessary
for the creation of the Common Market, the Treaty of Rome clearly
treats the movement of services as a crucial factor in facilitating the
free movement of goods between the member states. A concomitant
argument would point out that "services" would be an equally
important factor in coordinating the Community's external commer-
cial relations. 12  Finally, it would appear from the Treaty of Rome
that the term "trade" has been interpreted to cover the movement of
services as well as goods. This is particularly true in the case of the
antitrust provisions of the Treaty. 12 8
124. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, IV BIDS (March,
1969), Ad Article XVII(2).
125. See Krause, Why Exports Are Becoming Irrelevant, 8 THE BR O OKIN GS
BULL. No. 2, at 7 (1971).
126. See generally J. VANEK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THEORY AND
ECONOMIC POLICY ch. 2 (1962); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS ch. 5 (8th ed.
1970). The current account for the compilation of the balance of trade figures
would consist of the merchandise trade balance, as adjusted for "invisible" service
items.
127. Cf Code of Liberalization of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation Council, Part II (rev. ed. 1959) (concerning "invisible transactions"
(services)).
128. See, e.g., Practical Guide of the Commission: Articles 85 and 86 of the
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V. APPLICATION OF CCP TO COMMUNITY AGREEMENTS
A. The Contractual Aspects
Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome provides clearly that in the
post-transitional period the CCP will be based on uniform principles,
especially in the conclusion of "tariff and trade agreements." Again
what is unclear, however, is the precise meaning of the phrase "tariff
and trade agreements."
The first logical question is whether "tariff" and "trade" are to be
considered mutually exclusive terms or are to be treated as concentric
concepts--"trade" being the broader of the two terms. As with "tariff
and trade" in the titles of the "General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade," there appears to be no indication in the Treaty of Rome that
the two words are to be dealt with as exclusive terms. Although the
phrase "tariff and trade agreement" causes much ambiguity, this
writer suggests that the phrase "tariff and trade" implies no
inseparable division between the reference of the two terms. "Trade
agreement" should embrace the concept of "tariff agreement," as it
does in American practice, although the converse would not be
true.
12 9
The real dilemma presented by the phrase "tariff and trade
agreements" concerns its substantive content. Perhaps the best
approach to analyzing this problem is to examine the nature and the
legal basis of those tariff and trade agreements the Community has
concluded with third countries in the post-transitional period.
B. Tariff and Trade Agreements
In October of 1961 the Council of Ministers of the European
Economic Community had established, pursuant to articlell1of the
Treaty of Rome, a system of notification and consultation between
the member states and the EEC Commission concerning the con-
clusion, extension or renewal of commercial agreements with third
countries. To complement this system and to fulfill one of the basic
objectives of article 113 of the Treaty of Rome, the Council enacted
Decision 69/494, which was to be applicable from January 1, 1971.
The primary aim of this decision was to create a procedure that
would allow the progressive substitution of community agreements for
existing national accords that concern tariff and trade matters
EEC Treaty and the Relevant Regulations, A Manual for Firms, Part I, § 1(3)
(Pub. Serv. of the Eur. Communities Doc. No. 8062/5/IX/1962/5).
129. For a discussion of the meaning of "trade agreements in American
practice" see Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in U.S.
Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249 (1966).
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embraced by article 113.130 This decision places member states under
the obligation to "inform the Commission of bilateral treaties, accords
and arrangements concerning commercial relations with third countries
in the sense of Article 113" and to state whether an extension or
renewal will be required. This information will then be transmitted to
the other member states by the Commission."'
After receipt of this information, a procedure for preliminary
consultation is set up at the request of either a member state or the
Commission. This consultation is designed essentially to determine if
the bilateral agreement in question contains provisions that would
come within the scope of article 113. If the agreement does contain
such provisions, then the Council will ascertain whether they present
an obstacle to the implementation of the CCP. 132 If the provisions
are not an obstacle, then the Council, acting on a proposal by the
Commission, may authorize the member state concerned to extend or
renew the provisions for a period of not more than one year.'3 3 If the
provisions coming within the jurisdiction of article 113 are deemed an
obstruction to the implementation of the CCP, the Commission
submits a detailed report to the Council, setting out recommendations
for the Council to authorize the Commission to open Community
negotiations with the third country concerned. 134 These negotiations
are conducted according to article 113 by the Commission in
consultation with the special article 113 Committee appointed by the
Council.1
35
When the implementation of a Community negotiating procedure
would be impossible in fact, as in cases when certain state-trading
nations refuse to recognize the competence of the Community, the
Council may authorize the particular member state to conduct
bilateral negotiations. 36  At first glance this delegation may suggest
that a certain degree of concurrent competence to negotiate and
conclude commercial agreements exists between the Community and
the member states in the post-transitional period. 137 This conclusion
130. Decision 691494, supra note 5, preamble.
131. Decision 69/494, supra note 5, art. 1.
132. Decision 69/494, supra note 5, art. 2.
133. If the act in question contains an annual denunciation clause or an "EEC
clause," that extension or renewal can be granted for a period longer than one
year. Decision 69/494, supra note 5, art. 3.
134. Decision 69/494, supra note 5, art. 4.
135. Decision 69/494, supra note 5, art. 5.
136. Decision 69/494, supra note 5, art. 9.
137. Schneider, La mise en oeuvre de la politique commerciale commune de
la C.E.E.: Bilan et perspectives, 129 REV. MARCHE COMMUN 11, 20 (1970).
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is not well-founded, however, because the text of Decision 69/494
makes clear that the Community alone has the ultimate competence in
matters pertaining to article 113. Moreover, this type of delegation is
available only until the end of December, 1972, and even in those
situations in which such bilateral negotiations are permitted, they can
begin only after specific Council authorization setting certain guide-
lines to be followed.1 38 Furthermore, the results of such negotiation
must be transmitted by the member state to the Commission, which in
turn informs the other member states. If after five days no objections
are raised by the member states, the bilateral agreement in question
may be concluded; but, if objection is raised, then the agreement can
be concluded only on Council authorization. 139  Therefore, the
provisions of Decision 69/494 make clear the exclusive competence of
the Community concerning contractual agreements with third coun-
tries. Any deviation from this principle is only by virtue of specific
Community legislation enacted at its discretion. 4 °
Tariff Agreements.-Article 111 of the Treaty of Rome has granted
the Community a degree of competence in negotiating tariff agree-
138. Decision 69/494, supra note 5, arts. 9 & 120.
139. Decision 69/494, supra note 5, art. 13.
140. A series of derogations from the Council decision of October, 1961,
were authorized by the Council in 1969. For a list of these derogations see
Leonard & Simon, La mise en oeuvre de la politique commerciale: passage de la
piriode de transition a la periode difinitive, 107 REv. TRIM. DR. EuR. 157
(1971). The Council has subsequently continued to permit derogations pursuant
to Decision 69/494, both on renewals or extensions of existing bilateral
commercial agreements and on the conclusion of new bilateral agreements. See Id.
at 189; 1970 E.E.C. J.O. L262/18 (renewal of 18 commercial agreements with
third countries); 1971 E.E.C. J.O. L26/10 (renewal of cotton textile accords with
Japan); 1971 E.E.C. J.O. L56/8 (renewal of 17 commercial agreements with third
countries); 1971 E.E.C. J.O. L31/18 (renewal or extension of FCN-type
agreements with 36 countries); 1971 E.E.C. J.O. L122/24 (renewal of 20
commercial agreements with third countries); 1971 E.E.C. J.O. L122/26 (renewal
of cotton textile agreements with Japan); 1971 E.E.C. J.O. L248/71 (renewal of
over 80 commercial agreements with third countries). The authorization of new
bilateral accords has occurred primarily in relations with state-trading countries
because of their politically sensitive nature and the Community's desire to move
with caution in implementing the CCP. For a discussion of the Community's
approach toward state-trading nations see Rapport fait au nom de la commission
des relations 6conomiques extirieures sur les pro blmes des relations commercials
entre la Communaut6 et les pays a Commerce d'Etat d'Europe oriintale,
[1967-1968] EuR. PARL. Docs., No. 205. Unless a new Council decision rules
otherwise, however, at the end of 1972 even these state-trading countries will have
to deal with the Community directly in negotiating any new commercial
agreements within the scope of article 113.
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ments necessary to insure the implementation of the common customs
tariff by the end of the transitional period. In the post-transitional
period, these tariff agreements are to be based on "uniform
principles" throughout the Community. As previously discussed, the
term "uniform principles" under article 113 implies exclusive Com-
munity control; consequently, the Community was substituted for the
member states during the transitional period in all existing bilateral
tariff agreements.14 1
Under the mandate of articles 111 and 113, therefore, the
Community has assumed the obligations of the member states arising
under the GATT. As demonstrated by the highly publicized marathon
sessions of the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations and the earlier
Dillon Round, the power of the Community to deal with the question
of tariff negotiations has been fully established.14 2 For example, in
the Kennedy Round, the Council of Ministers issued a negotiating
mandate to the Commission under article 111.143 Pursuant to this
mandate the Commission negotiated for the member states such
matters as the fixing of tariff schedules and bindings, the abrogation
of the American Selling Price, 144  the fixing of minimum and
maximum prices on wheat, 14 1 food aid to developing countries,
146
and the drafting of an antidumping code.
1 4 7
141. Since the wording of article 111 implies that tariff negotiations during the
transitional period are to become the exclusive competence of the Community, it
would seem logical that the changed wording in article 113 cannot be construed in
such a way as to imply that the Community would have a lesser competence (e.g.,
concurrent powers) in the post-transitional period than it possessed in the
transitional period.
142. See generally Rapport fait au nom de la commission des relations
6conomiques ext6rieures sur les r6sultats des n6gociations Kennedy et les
conclusions A en tirer, [1967-1968] EuR. PARL. Docs., No. 176.
143. Decision du Conseil No. 68/411, du 27 novembre 1967, portant
conclusion d'accords multilat6raux sign6s a l'issue de la Conference de n6gocia-
tions commerciales de 1964-1967, 1968 E.E.C. J.O. L305/1. For a consideration
of the Kennedy Round see Rehm, The Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations, 62
AM. J. INT'L L. 403 (1968).
144. See Accord concernant principalement les produits chimiques, addi-
tionnel au Protocole de Gen~ve (1967) annexd A l'accord g~n~ral sur les tarifs
douaniers et le commerce, 1968 E.E.C. J.0. L305/3, art. 2.
145. See Memorandum d'accord sur les elements de base pour ]a negociation
d'un arrangements mondial sur les c~r~ales, 1968 E.E.C. J.O. L305/9, art. 2.
146. 1968 E.E.C. J.0. L30519, § 5.
147. See Accord relatif a la mise en oeuvre de l'article VI de l'accord g~n6ral
sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce, 1968 E.E.C. J.O. 305/12.
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The agreements reached after the Kennedy Round, however, were
signed not only by the Community but also by the EEC member
states individually. Again, the use of the "mixed procedure" militates
against a conclusion that the Community possesses exclusive treaty-
making powers. In the case of pure tariff agreements, however, this
power appears clearly to be within the competence of the Community
in the post-transitional period.
14
The conclusion of the Kennedy Round represented a high point in
Community development. Apart from achieving substantial tariff
reductions on 70 per cent of those imports on which the industrialized
countries had imposed tariff protection, the Kennedy Round demon-
strated that the Community could function effectively as a unified
economic entity in confronting an economic "superpower" such as
the United States. As J. Rey summarized:
Politically the Kennedy Round was an exceptionally important factor in the
cohesion of the Community: for the first time the EEC appeared as a single
unit vis-a-vis non-member countries and was represented by a single
negotiator, defending a jointly agreed position .... For the first time too,
the Community negotiated on an equal footing with the greatest economic
power in the world .... The success of the Kennedy Round represents a
considerable strengthening of the Community, both internally and in the
eyes of the world.
149
Trade Agreements.-In the post-transitional period the Community
has concluded trade agreements with Spain, Israel and Yugoslavia, and
has renewed existing agreements with Iran and Lebanon.'5 0 These
148. This is evidenced by a series of tariff agreements that recently have been
concluded solely between the Community and various third countries. See, e.g.,
1968 E.E.C. J.O. L311/24 (agreement with United Kingdom); 1969 E.E.C. J.0.
L257/1 (agreement with Austria); 1970 E.E.C. J.0. L54/4.
149. Rey, Successful Conclusion of the Kennedy Round, 6 BULL. EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 1, 5-7 (1967).
150. See Accord entre la Communautd 6conomique europaenne et l'Espagne,
1970 E.E.C. J.0. L182/2 [hereinafter cited as Spanish Agreement] ; Accord entre
la Communaut6 6conomique europ~enne et l'Etat d'Israel, 1970 E.E.C. J.0.
L183/2 [hereinafter cited as Israeli Agreement]; Accord commercial entre la
Communautd 6conomique europ~enne et la rdpublique socialiste fdd6rative de
Yougoslavie, 1970 E.E.C. J.0. L58/2 [hereinafter cited as Yugoslavian Agree-
ment]; Accord sur les 6changes commerciaux et la coop6ration technique entre la
Communaut6 6conomique europ6enne et les Etats membres, d'une part, et la
R~publique libanaise, d'autre part, 1968 E.E.C. J.0. L14612 [hereinafter cited as
Lebanese Agreement], renewed 1971 E.E.C. J.0. L181/11; Accord commerciale
entre la Communautd 6conomique europ6enne et le gouvernment imperial de
l'Iran, 1963 E.E.C. J.0. 2555 [hereinafter cited as Iranian Agreement], renewed
1971 E.E.C. J.0. L262/54.
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agreements, in conjunction with the association accords with Greece,
Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia and Malta, form part of a piecemeal
Community policy for the "Mediterraneanization" of the EEC. The
reason the Community has embarked on such a policy can be
attributed both to the growing commercial links between the
Community and the various nonmember Mediterranean countries and
to a desire to help advance the cause of peace and economic stability
in the entire Mediterranean area.
51s
As discussed previously, the Greek and Turkish association agree-
ments were signed under the "mixed procedure" system, while those
with Morocco, Tunisia and Malta were not. The latter three
agreements, however, resembled a straightforward trade agreement
rather than the association agreement concluded with Greece and
Turkey. To add to the confusion, the Lebanese agreement contained
provisions for technical assistance similar to those found in an
association agreement, and was originally based upon article 111 but
signed under the "mixed procedure" system. No logical rationale
seems to have prevailed. Perhaps the best explanation for the diversity
in the legal nature of these various agreements has been offered by the
Political Affairs Committee of the European Assembly:
[T]he legal differences between the agreements concluded by the Com-
munity are mainly political in origin. In other words the legal character of
the agreements was in each case determined by the political affinities that
the Community thought it discerned and in light of the political and
economic interests of the Community or of some of its influential Member
States.' S2
The Israeli Agreement.-On June 29, 1970, a trade agreement
concluded under article 113 between the EEC and Israel was signed by
the President-in-Office of the Council of Ministers and the President of
the European Commission for the EEC, and the Minister of Foreign
Affairs for Israel. This five year preferential accord was the product of
extended negotiations that began in 1961, and it replaced an earlier
nonpreferential trade accord between the two parties which had
expired in 1967.11 The aim of the present agreement was to foster
trade between the two parties and to lay the groundwork for
151. See generally Rapport fait au nom de la commission du commerce
ext6rieur sur la politique commerciale de la Communaut6 dans ]a Mediterrande,
[1970-1971] EuR. PARL. DoCs., No. 246.
152. Id. at 19.
153. See Accord commercial entre la Communaut6 6conomique europdenne
et 'Etat d'Israel (first accord), 1964 E.E.C. J.0. 1518.
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negotiating a new accord in the future based on more liberal trade
principles.'
5 4
Essentially, the Israeli agreement provided a system of preferential
trade treatment between the parties. The EEC offered tariff conces-
sions on more than 85 per cent of all industrial products, and
approximately 80 per cent of all Israeli agricultural products imported
into the Community."'5 Accordingly, Israel agreed to tariff conces-
sions on more than 50 per cent of the industrial and agricultural
products imported from the Community to Israel."'
In addition to tariff concessions, the agreement also covers the
procedure to be followed before a contracting party can take
protective measures to offset any dumping or subsidization on the
part of the other party.' Provision is also made for safeguard
measures that may be taken by either party in the event of balance of
payment or other economic difficulties."5 8 The agreement further
provides that the transfer of payments from the trade of goods
covered by the agreement is subject to restrictions by either party.1
5 9
The Spanish Agreement.-Like the agreement with Israel, the trade
agreement with Spain is based on preferential trade treatment between
the parties and does not require any long-term commitments from
either party. The Spanish accord is the product of extensive
negotiations that began in 1967; it was signed on June 29, 1970, by
the President-in-Office of the Council and the President of the
Commission on behalf of the Community, and by the Spanish Minister
of Foreign Affairs. The initial agreement is for a period of six years
and expires in October of 1976.60
154. Eighteen months before the actual expiration date of the agreements,
negotiations may be initiated for the purpose of concluding a new and more
comprehensive agreement. Israeli Agreement, supra note 150, art. 17.
155. Israeli Agreement, supra note 150, annex 1, art. 12. For a commentary
on the Israeli Agreement see Rapport fait au nom de la commission des relations
conomiques ext6rieures sur l'accord commercial entre la Communaut6 6cono-
mique europ~enne et l'Etat d'Israel, [1970-1971] EuR. PARL. Docs., No. 167.
156. For the exact formula to be followed in the reduction in the rates of
Israeli tariff duties see Israeli Agreement, supra note 150, annex III, art. 1.
157. Israeli Agreement, supra note 150, annex III, art. 1.
158. Israeli Agreement, supra note 150, annex III, art. 11.
159. Israeli Agreement, supra note 150, annex III, art. 10.
160. For an analysis of the Spanish Agreement see Rapport fait au nom de la
commission des relations 6conomiques ext6rieures sur l'accord commercial entre
]a Communaut6 4conomique europ~enne et l'Espagne, [1970-1971] EuR. PARL.
DoCs., No. 164.
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The agreement anticipates a two-stage process for the liberalization
of trade between the two parties, although it dictates provisions
covering only the first stage. During this period lasting at least six
years, the terms of the agreement are to be purely commercial in
nature.16 1 The transition from the first to the second stage is to be
effectuated by another common agreement between the parties.
On Spanish industrial products, the Community has offered a 60
per cent tariff reduction and removal of quantitative restrictions on
substantially all such imports into the Community. Further, the
agreement anticipates the possibility of increasing the general tariff
preference to 70 per cent. Except for important concessions on such
items as citrus fruits and nonrefined olive oil, the Community intends
to deal with agricultural products on an ad hoc basis. 6 2
Spain had already extended significant tariff concessions to the
Community on industrial products, but agreed further to reduce
quantitative restrictions on at least 95 per cent of Community
industrial imports by the sixth year of the agreement. Liberalization
of quantity restrictions on agricultural products is continued at a pace
paralleling the reduction of tariffs for industrial products. 16 3  As in
the Israeli agreement, the Spanish agreement includes provisions for
antidumping and safeguard measures, for the treatment of transfer of
payments concerning goods covered by the agreement, and for the
management of the agreement by a joint committee.' 64
The Yugoslavian Agreement.-On March 17, 1970, a nonpreferen-
tial trade agreement was signed between the Community and Yugo-
slavia. This agreement was signed for the Community by the President-
in-Office of the Council and the President of the Commission, and for
Yugoslavia by a member of the Federal Executive Council. The accord
came into force for a three year period beginning May 1, 1970.165
The agreement provides that tariff rates agreed on in the Kennedy
Round would be applied immediately to certain industrial and
agricultural products. The central concession, however, is that the
Community agreed to adjust its agricultural levy on "baby veal"-a
product representing 40 per cent of Yugoslavia's agricultural exports
161. Spanish Agreement, supra note 150, art. 1.
162. Spanish Agreement, supra note 150, annex I.
163. Spanish Agreement, supra note 150, annex II.
164. Spanish Agreement, supra note 150, arts. 9-11.
165. See generally Rapport fait au nom de la commission des relations
dconomiques extrieures sur l'accord commercial entre la Communaut6 6cono-
mique europ~enne et la rpublique socialiste f6d&ative de Yougoslavie,
[1970-1971] EUR. PARL. Docs., No. 64.
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to the EEC-and other categories of high quality beef, according to a
prescribed timetable. 16 6
The real significance of the agreement goes far beyond any trade
concessions. For the first time, the Community has formally consoli-
dated commercial relations with an Eastern European state-trading
nation. The heart of the agreement states that "the Contracting Parties
shall endeavor to promote and intensify their commercial relations on
the basis of equality and mutual advantages." '1 67 Supervision over the
terms of the agreement will be in the hands of a joint committee. 168
In addition, the Community has specified, for the first time, in a
commercial agreement the extent to which liberalization will be
extended to a nonmember country with the following language: "the
highest degree of liberalization of imports and exports [are] appli-
cable in a general manner with regard to third countries."'6 9
Nonetheless, the agreement also makes clear that certain advantages
accorded to member states shall not be applicable to Yugoslavia, 7
and that in addition "both the general and the specific provisions of
the agreement referring to particular products replace the provisions
of the agreements concluded between Yugoslavia and the Member
States of the Community which are incompatible with those of the
said agreement or identical to them."'' Again, therefore, the
primary significance of the agreement is that it creates a legal basis for
the development of future commercial and economic relations
between the Community and the Federal Socialist Republic of
Yugoslavia.
The Lebanese Agreement.-An agreement on trade and technical
cooperation came into effect between the Community and the
166. Yugoslavian Agreement, supra note 150, annex 1. As noted by one
source: "The adjustment of the levy is mainly designed to give Yugoslavia a
financial, but not a commercial advantage. Thus, it was agreed that Yugoslavia
would take all necessary steps to ensure that the free-at-frontier offer price plus
the customs duty and the reduced levy would not remain at the same level as in
the case where the standard levy is applied." 3 BULL. EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES, No. 8, at 16-18 (1970).
167. Yugoslavian Agreement, supra note 150, art. IV.
168. Yugoslavian Agreement, supra note 150, art. VII. The joint committee is
to consist of representatives of both the EEC and Yugoslavia, and is to meet at
least once a year (although more frequent meetings are anticipated). The task of
the committee is not only to supervise the operation of the present agreement but
also to make suggestions for a further development of trade based on mutual
advantages between the two contracting parties.
169. Yugoslavian Agreement, supra note 150, art. III(1).
170. Yugoslavian Agreement, supra note 150, art. II(a).
171. Yugoslavian Agreement, supra note 150, Echange de lettres No. 1.
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Republic of Lebanon on July 1, 1968. It was concluded on the basis
of article 111 but was signed under the "mixed procedure" system.
The only conceivable rationale for the use of this procedure is the
insistence of the Council of Ministers on limiting Community
agreements to matters of a traditional trade content. Apparently, the
agreement's provisions for minimal technical assistance extended by
the Community to Lebanon are considered outside the exclusive
treaty-making competence of the Community.
1 72
This agreement stipulates that trade relations are to be conducted
on a nonpreferential basis. The contracting parties agreed to grant
each other most-favored-nation treatment under certain circumstances
in matters such as the levying of duties on exports and imports. 173
Technical aid to Lebanon is also to be coordinated by the parties 174
and can consist of the following: (a) sending experts, specialists or
teachers to public bodies for research or teaching institutions in
Lebanon; (b) the technical training of Lebanese subjects at public
bodies, educational institutions, industrial, agricultural, commercial or
banking concerns in the member states of the Community; (c) the
preparation of studies and inquiries into the full development of the
resources of Lebanon; and (d) if necessary, supplying technical
equipment to research or teaching institutions in Lebanon.
175
Technical cooperation is subject to "joint agreements, reached
through a bilateral procedure, between each of the Member States
concerned and Lebanon, bearing in mind the conclusions arrived at by
the joint committee," set up by the agreement. 176
Originally the agreement was to expire on June 30, 1971. Although
negotiations were then under way for the conclusion of a new
preferential type of trade agreement, the original agreement was
temporarily extended for a one year period, in accordance with the
172. The "mixed procedure system" is a procedure for concluding interna-
tional agreements between the EEC and third countries by which both the EEC
(as an international legal entity) and the member states individually conclude the
agreement. This has been particularly used in the conclusion of EEC "association
agreements." Such a procedure has been subject to considerable criticism as its
legal basis is in doubt, and as it obscures exactly what is the competence of the
EEC under the particular agreements. For further discussion see INSTITUT
D'ETUDES EUROPEENNES UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES, L'Asso-
CIATION A LA COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE (1970).
173. Lebanese Agreement, supra note 150, arts. I & II.
174. Lebanese Agreement, supra note 150, art. V.
175. Lebanese Agreement, supra note 150, art. VI.
176. Lebanese Agreement, supra note 150, art. VII. Article IV discusses the
creation of the joint committee.
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provision permitting annual renewal and under article 113 of the
Treaty of Rome.'7 7
The Iranian Agreement.-The Iranian agreement, signed in Brussels
on October 14, 1963, marked the first purely commercial agreement
negotiated by the Community pursuant to articles 111 and 114 of the
Rome Treaty. The original term of the agreement was for three years,
with provision for an annual renewal thereafter by agreement of the
parties."7 8 The latest renewal of the agreement was concluded in
November of 1971.179
The Iranian agreement was limited to temporary reductions by the
Community of the common external tariff and a nondiscriminatory
tariff quota on Iranian carpets, certain dried fruits and caviar. 180
These products accounted for about fifteen per cent of Iran's trade
with the Community at the time; petroleum oil comprised 75 per cent
of Iran's exports to the Community and, therefore, was not subject to
a Community tariff.' 8 ' No specific concessions were made by the
Government of Iran, although a joint committee set up by the
agreement was to study ways to further extend trade harmoniously
between the two parties.'82
Other Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Agreements.-The Com-
munity has concluded various other bilateral commercial agreements
with third countries pursuant to article 113 of the Treaty of Rome.
The Community also has entered into a series of agreements pursuant
to the Food Aid Convention and the Long-term International Cotton
Textile Agreement. Under the Food Aid Convention of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement of 1967, which expired on June 30, 1971,
the Community has concluded over 30 bilateral agreements with
developing countries concerning the type, amount and conditions of
177. Decision du Conseil No. 71/207, du 12 juillet 1971, portant conclusion
de l'accord reconduisant l'accord sur les 6changes commerciaux et la cooperation
technique entre la Communaut6 4conomique europ~enne et les Etats membres,
d'une part, et ]a Rpublic libanaise, d'autre part, 1971 E.E.C. J.0. L181/11.
178. Iranian Agreement, supra note 150, art. V.
179. D~cision du Conseil No. 71/385, du 16 novembre 1971, portant
conclusion de l'accord reconduisant l'accord commercial entre la Communaut6
6conomique europ6enne et l'Iran, 1971 E.E.C. J.0. L262/54.
180. Iranian Agreement, supra note 150, arts. I & II.
181. For a consideration of the various policy factors surrounding the
negotiation of the Iranian Agreement (along with the one with Israel and the
Association Agreements with Turkey and Greece) see S. HENIG, EXTERNAL
RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION AND TRADE
AGREEMENTS, 25-38 (1971).
182. Iranian Agreement, supra note 150, art. HIL
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food aid to be granted to third countries."8 3 Similarly, pursuant to its
accession to the Long-term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles, the
Community has entered bilateral agreements with such countries as
South Korea, India, the Republic of China and Pakistan on the basis
of article 113.184 In addition, accords have been concluded with
Pakistan on imports of jute, with India and Pakistan on imports of
handicrafts, and with Austria and Denmark on imports of livestock for
processing purposes.1 s
Of special importance is the commercial agreement made in
November of 1971 between the Community and Argentina.18 6 This is
the first accord to be concluded by the Community with a Latin
American country; it is to last for an initial three year term, and
contains an annual renewal clause for the period thereafter. The
183. The Community has furnished food aid by bilateral agreement with the
following countries: Algeria, Cameroon, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Jordan,
Lebanon, Morocco, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Peru, Somalie, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey,
Upper Volta and Yemen. In addition, the Community has concluded bilateral
agreements on food aid with the World Food Program and the International
Committee of the Red Cross.
184. See, e.g., Decision du Conseil No. 71/89, du 1 f~vrier 1971, portant
conclusion d'accords entre ]a Communautd 6conomique europ~enne, d'une part,
et respectivement, la rdpublique de l'Inde, la R6publique arabe unie, ]a r~publique de
Chine et la rdpublique islamique du Pakistan, d'autre part, sur le commerce des
textiles de cotton, 1971 E.E.C. J.O. L431/1; Decision du Conseil No. 71/117, du
15 fvrier 1971, portant conclusion d'un accord entre ]a Communaut6 6cono-
mique europ6enne et la r6publique de Cor~e sur le commerce des textiles de
cotton, 1971 E.E.C. J.O. L55/12.
185. See D6cision 70/374, du 20 juillet 1970, portant conclusion d'un accord
entre la Communaut4 6conomique europ6enne et la Pakistan sur le commerce des
produits de jute, 1970 E.E.C. J.O. L170/4; D~cision No. 70/386, du 27 juillet
1970, portant conclusion d'un accord entre la Communautd 4conomique
europ~enne et l'Inde et d'un accord entre la Communaut6 6conomique
europ~enne et le Pakistan sur le commerce des produits faits a la main, 1970
E.E.C. J.O. L176/1; Decision No. 71/181, du 30 mars 1971, portant conclusion
de l'accord sous forme d'6change des lettres reconduisant l'accord entre la
Communaut6 6conomique europ~enne et l'Autriche sur le b~tail de fabrication,
1971 E.E.C. J.O. L99/1 (the original agreement can be found at 1970 E.E.C. J.O.
L140/1); Decision No. 71/182, du 30 mars 1971, portant conclusion de l'accord
sous forme d'6change des lettres reconduisant l'accord bilateral pour le b6tail de
fabrication entre la Communautd 6conomique europ~enne et le Denmark, 1971
E.E.C. J.0. L99/4 (the original agreement was signed at Geneva on June 30, 1967,
for a period of three years).
186. Accord commercial entre ]a Communaut6 6conomique europ~enne et la
R6publique argentine, 1971 E.E.C. J.O. L249/19 [hereinafter cited as Argentinian
Agreement].
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objective of the agreement is "to consolidate and extend traditional
commercial and economic relations between the European Economic
Community and the Republic of Argentina."' 8 7 The Argentine
agreement is based on the principle of nondiscrimination,' 8 8 and each
party extends to each other the highest degree of liberalization for
imports and exports that is applicable to a third country. 8 9 The core
of this nonpreferential agreement concerns tariff and nontariff trade
concessions on beef and veal. 19° The present accord replaces any
bilateral agreements between member states of the Community and
Argentina that may be in conflict with it. 1 9' Here again the
Community stressed its exclusive powers derived from article 113 of
the Treaty of Rome.
Finally, the Community has concluded several multilateral agree-
ments pursuant to article 113 of the Treaty of Rome in the
post-transitional period: the International Wheat Agreement of 1971,
incorporating the Wheat Trade Convention and Food Aid Convention
of 1971,192 and the Fourth International Tin Agreement of 1971. "9
In addition, the Community has participated in renewal of the
Long-term Arrangement for Cotton Textiles.'9 4
These multilateral agreements have posed a series of problems for
the Community. 9 s First, some countries, mostly those in Eastern
Europe, have hesitated to recognize the Community as an interna-
tional legal entity. This became evident during the negotiation of the
International Sugar Agreement in 1968,96 conducted under the
auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). During the course of the negotiations, the U.S.S.R.
challenged the right of the Community to participate in the
187. Argentinian Agreement, supra note 186, preamble. For an analysis of the
agreement see Rapport fait au nom de la commission des relations 4conomiques
ext6rieures sur l'accord commercial entre la Communaut6 4conomique europ6-
enne et la Rpublique d'Argentine, [1971-1972] EUR. PARL. Docs., No. 251.
188. Argentinian Agreement, supra note 186, art. 1.
189. Argentinian Agreement, supra note 186, art. 2.
190. Argentinian Agreement, supra note 186, art. 4(1) & annex I.
191. Argentinian Agreement, supra note 186, art. 6.
192. For the English text of the International Wheat Agreement of 1971,
which replaced an earlier 1967 version, see T.I.A.S. No. 7144 (1971).
193. For a discussion of the renewal of the International Tin Agreement see
1972 E.E.C. J.O. L90/2. The agreement is discussed in 4 BULL. EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, No. 2, at 76 (1971).
194. For a discussion of the renewal of the Long-Term Agreement on Cotton
Textiles see 1970 E.E.C. J.O. L225/29.
195. See Leonard & Simon, supra note 140, at 154-56.
196. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. TDfsugar.7/2/rev/17 (1968).
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Conference. As a result of this challenge, neither the Community nor
its member states have signed the Sugar Agreement.
It should also be noted that the multilateral agreements concluded
in the post-transitional period have been concluded under the "mixed
procedure" system. As to the various association agreements con-
cluded in this manner, a controversy arises concerning which
provisions in the agreements are considered by the Council of
Ministers to fall exclusively within the Community's competence. An
illustration of the problems surrounding these multilateral agreements
occurred in the negotiation of the Tin Agreement. Before the
Community could participate in the negotiation it first had to receive
a mandate from the Council. In granting this mandate, the Council
noted:
[I]n view of the type of agreement envisaged, some of the provisions at
present being negotiated come within the scope of commercial policy, while
others relate more broadly to economic and financial policy. For this
reason, the Commission has been authorized, in accordance with Article 113
of the Treaty, to negotiate the commercial aspect of the proposed
Agreement, whereas the Member States will, naturally, step in as regards the
other aspects of the negotiations.
197
Again the Council failed to specify precisely which provisions should
be considered as within article 113. Consequently, the following
provision was inserted into the Tin Agreement in order to satisfy the
objections of the Eastern bloc concerning EEC participation:
An intergovernmental organization having responsibilities with respect to
the negotiation of international agreements may participate in the Interna-
tional Tin Agreement. Such organization shall not itself vote. In matters
within its jurisdiction, its Member States may vote collectively.
193
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Any assessment of the common commercial policy proceeds from
two contending assumptions of substantial import. The first is
supported by the text of article 113 and contends that the CCP is an
"undefined concept of Community law." Accepting this premise, a
logical argument is that "commercial policy [embraces] all the
measures intended to regulate economic relations with the outside
world." 199  Proceeding from this assumption the CCP could cover
197. 3 BULL. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, No. 6, at 84 (1970).
198. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTH
GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION 1970 at 320
(1971).
199. Pescatore, supra note 27, at 917, 921.
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matters of establishment, capital movements and transportation when
they have a direct or indirect effect on the movement of goods and
services between the Community and third countries.2"'
The second assumption is that the CCP is a limited concept
dependent on the will of the member states and the Council of
Ministers for its implementation. An analysis based on this assumption
would emphasize the practical difficulties with the implementation of
the CCP, and proceed very much like Professor Everling's observa-
ions:
It should have become clear how much tension and overlapping is arising
from the fact that functions and powers previously vested in the States are
now assigned to the Community on the one hand and the member States on
the other. In exercising its powers, the Community affects the powers
reserved by member States in many ways, in some instances even in their
central parts. As member States remain in the present stage of integration
responsible for the fate of their people-in contradistinction to what their
status in a federation would be-the Community is confined within natural
limits which it would find hard to overstep even if this were legitimate.
2 0 1
Between the limits of an overly ambitious interpretation of the
content of the CCP and the inescapable realms of realpolitik, however,
several conclusions may reasonably be drawn. First, the Community
possesses exclusive power under the CCP in the following matters,
which are enumerated specifically by article 113 of the Treaty of
Rome:
(1) Tariff agreements.
(2) Trade agreements. This term is coextensive with the entire
content of the CCP, because it is related to the Community's
contractual relations with the outside world.
(3) Export policy. Although this term is rather imprecise, it
clearly embraces matters concerning export subsidies, export
credit and export insurance. In the opinion of Le Tallec,
"export policy ... covers all measures taken by the authori-
ties which exercise a special influence on exports."20 2 The
measure, therefore, must be intended primarily to have a
significant impact on the export of goods or services. Under
this interpretation, such measures as production subsidies
would not come under "export policy," because their
200. For a further discussion of the broad interpretation of article 113 see C.
KIM, LA COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE DANS LES RELA-
TIONS COMMERCIALES INTERNATIONALES 43-46 (1971).
201. Everling, supra note 7, at 164.
202. Le Tallec, supra note 21, at 735-36.
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primary purpose is not to have a special or primary influence
on exports.
20 3
(4) Commercial protective measures. These would consist prima-
rily of antidumping measures and the imposition of counter-
vailing duties, although these two types of measures are not
exhaustive of the general category.
(5) The fixing and liberalization of quotas.
(6) Regulations pertaining to payments connected with the
movement of goods and the transfer of these payments.
Examples of the scope of these matters under the CCP can be
found in the Israeli and Spanish trade agreements. 0 4
(7) Regulations concerning tax discrimination against goods from
third countries. Again examples can be found in the Israeli
and Spanish trade agreements.
2 0 -
Secondly, although not deducible from the present state of EEC law,
the following matters also are reasonably within the scope of the CCP:
(1) The supply of services.
(2) Transportation measures that have a direct influence on the
flow of goods and services to and from the Community. The
act of transportation itself would constitute a service.206
(3) The regulation of prices, to give the Community a direct
influence on exports and imports. The Community appears
to have this power in view of its signing of the Wheat Trade
Convention at the end of the Kennedy Round. Because this
Convention was signed under the "mixed procedure" system,
however, it is not clear whether this power is the Com-
munity's exclusively.
Finally, the following matters appear to be not within the scope of the
CCP:
(1) Matters concerning technical assistance, as demonstrated by
the Lebanese trade agreement.
203. The primary purpose of production subsidies is to influence the general
production or consumption of a certain product irrespective of exports or
imports. For a consideration of the difficulties in distinguishing between srbsidies
affecting domestic markets and those affecting imports and exports see J.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, ch. 15 (1970).
204. See article 10 of these agreements.
205. See article 3 of these agreements.
206. Cf. Stabenow, Opportunities for an External Policy of the EEC in the
Field of Transport, 4 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 32 (suggests that the CCP should
apply to the external aspects of the transport sector of the Community).
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(2) Matters generally relating to establishment and to foreign
exchange of payments, unless they directly affect the
movement of imports and exports.20 7
In summary, the best standard to follow in determining whether a
matter is within the scope of the CCP is to conclude that the CCP
empowers the proper authorities to take all measures that have a
direct influence on the international movement of goods and services.
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207. The French Treaty, as noted supra, contains provisions on the "employ-
ment of specialists" and "capital movements." By its exclusion of the French
Treaty from the list of FCN's containing provisions falling under the CCP, it is
clear that the Council does not take a broad approach to the content of the CCP.
